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As a result of the doctoral research developed by the main author 
(Vargas-Chaves, 2017), it was identified the evolution and perspectives of 
the pharmaceutical patent in the international trade system, as well as it 
future legal research needs in this topic, both immediate and long-term. 
Furthermore, a number of problems of public health were highlighted in 
which the patent-term-extension mechanisms have produced a lack of 
access to medicines. 
These reflections are presented in this report, in order to propose 
a discussion from the issue of justified exceptions to patent rights, since 
such general interest ultimately responded to public health, which is of 
paramount importance. As reported in the doctoral thesis, the patent 
regime for pharmaceutical inventions often finds this priority a source of 
seemingly irreconcilable tensions between the right of access to medicines 
and the fostering of pharmaceutical innovation through the exclusivity 
provided by the patent. 
As far as policy is concerned, this reality poses a significant challenge 
to the Spanish State by regulating the pharmaceutical sector so that it might 
fit into the newly emerging scenario. Thus, the Higher Governing Board 
of Pharmacy was created as a body for decision-making on scientific and 
administrative issues related to drugs. An example of this is the pharmacy 
ordinances issued by Royal Decree of 18 April 1860, granting pharmacists 
drug production exclusivity throughout the Spanish territory. 
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However, returning to the mentioned tensions, on the issue of (i.) 
innovation support through exclusivity, the Law of 30 July 1878 first 
adopted the acceptation of patent to replace the so-called privileges; and in 
terms of (ii.) guarded general interest concerning public health, it was with 
the Industrial Property Statute, Royal Decree-Law of 26 July 1929 until it 
became Republic Law of 16 September 1931, that the compulsory license 
for the exploitation of a patent in favor of a third party was conceived as 
a mechanism to facilitate access to inventions when their owners lacked 
technical or economic capacities to develop the patented product or process 
on their own. 
As may be inferred, both regulatory initiatives are strongly focused on 
the need to promote the development of new drugs and facilitate access to 
them, at least in specific situations, establishing a precedent in the general 
interest and social role of inventions.
Nonetheless, regarding pharmaceutical inventions, it should be noted 
that Article 20 of the Law of 16 May 1902 and the Paris Convention of 
1883 had by then excluded the protection granted by patents to medicines 
of all kinds, understood as pharmaceutical products themselves. For these 
purposes, as can be gathered from the text, Royal Decree of 7 December 
1933 drew a dividing line between medicinal products for human use and 
those for veterinary use. 
The importance of this regulation lies in the fact that the Order of 
14 May 1934 left the door open for the Spanish pharmaceutical industry 
to establish its own regulations regarding the production and distribution 
of drugs, vaccines, serums, and disinfectants. Indeed, the foregoing set the 
bases for the strengthening of policy-making in the pharmaceutical industry, 
alongside the consolidation of the industrial aspect itself, since, as yielded 
by research estimates, there were nearly a thousand drug manufacturing 
laboratories with export capacity at the time.
And even though the patent on pharmaceutical products had not yet 
been conceived under Spanish law, our findings and the events addressed 
here lead us to believe that the need to protect this type of innovations was 
a fact. 
Accordingly, (i.) in the late forties, by establishing guidelines and 
rules for the management of the research results obtained by institutes 
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and under their sponsorship, public bodies such as the Spanish National 
Research Council (CSIC) expressed the major role-played by patents in 
terms of protecting industry and national interest, where health is indeed 
a crucial concern; 
(ii.) the activity of the pharmaceutical industry begins to be taken 
seriously, since by implementing new requirements for this industry in 
the fifties and sixties and demanding that, alongside safety parameters, 
laboratories comply with efficacy standards proven through controlled 
clinical trials for the approval of new drugs, medicinal substances and 
proprietary medicines. This opens the door to the protection of the data 
obtained from such trials in the form of a sui generis patent-related right;
(iii.) from a theoretical perspective, a new era begins where new 
technologies become a strategic axis in the increase of aspects such as a 
country’s gross domestic product, as was proposed in The Solow Residual, 
from which the need to urge governors to foster policies for the protection 
of new creations was inferred, and, according to the conclusions drawn 
from Robert Solow’s theory by certain experts in the area, especially in the 
field of pharmaceuticals. 
In fact, moving beyond theory, our findings show that, in practice, 
the pharmaceutical industry had a powerful start followed by a rapid rise, 
on the one hand thanks to investment in it, which allowed laboratories 
to conduct numerous clinical trials that led to the production of once 
unimaginable medicines such as antibiotics, diuretics and antidiabetic 
drugs, among many others and, on the other hand, because, with the rise of 
molecular biology and biotechnology, the sector intensified research for the 
production of new drugs, becoming a referent among the rest of innovative 
sectors in intensive technological R&D. In short, patent protection of these 
inventions was already a pressing need, thereafter becoming the great 
challenge to be faced by the Spanish legal system.
However, this was not the only challenge to be faced by Spanish law 
in this area, since the issues addressed to adjust the forthcoming patent 
system to the demands of a society immersed in a process of globalization 
and regional integration were also diverse and complex. Law 11/1986 on 
patents ended a process that had involved intensive discussions and failures. 
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Not for nothing were initiatives such as the legislative draft presented on 3 
April 1982 before the Spanish Parliament rejected. 
Patent law was finally introduced in Spain as part of a standardized 
patent regime by which states approved procedures to enable a future 
flow of inventions among them within an effective protection framework. 
Furthermore, such ‘future flow’ was actually the main goal of regulatory 
initiatives such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty or the 1973 Munich 
Convention and, certainly, the desired objective of the new European 
Community scenario that advocated effective free movement of goods as a 
premise for the achievement of true economic union in Europe. 
Likewise, this background proved very positive for the pharmaceutical 
sector, as revealed by the doctoral research analysis of the measures that 
were becoming implemented to safeguard the interests of a growing 
economic and industrial engine, part of which was a powerful industry 
that was benefited by the commitment of the member States to include 
pharmaceutical products as patent-eligible inventions. 
Spain was no exception and, as observed, during the transition 
period that preceded its entry into the European Economic Community, 
the commitment to integrate the protection of chemical and pharmaceutical 
inventions in its regulatory framework was undertaken more than a matter 
of political and social economy than as a technical and legal issue. The 
reason, as mentioned, is that until then, Spain’s pharmaceutical industry 
had been clearly subject to other markets, depending upon them to obtain 
supplies of substances required to produce its drugs.
It is also unquestionable that this background provides a whole new 
setting for the research objective since, besides the above, the measures 
that were taken to reconcile Spain’s patent system included both substantial 
changes in compulsory licenses, and procedural changes, envisaging for 
the first time the reversal of the burden of the suspected infringed in patent 
infringement lawsuits.
Another conclusion drawn from the historical analysis conducted is 
that the above gave rise to a major challenge for the Spanish State, which 
was faced with the need to adjust a new and significantly complex element 
such as a new patent law to a system designed to fit into the, at the time, 
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new landscape of private international law and European Community 
patent law. 
Proof of this are the consequences that revolved around Spain’s 
accession to the 1973 Munich Convention, one of them being the problem 
posed by the periods established to invoke the reservations referred to in 
article 167 of such instrument, and only for chemical and pharmaceutical 
products. 
Regarding the recognition of pharmaceutical products as patentable 
inventions, the 1973 Munich Convention was the instrument that paved the 
way to this new reality where the economic exploitation of these inventions 
in member states was accepted as attached to their owners, although this 
was already an acknowledged fact in countries such as Ireland and Germany. 
However, whereas, beyond the opening it involved, this Convention 
was not the instrument that achieved the goal –which was accomplished 
by the TRIPS Agreement, which will be addressed below-, it was the next 
logical step to adjust Spanish law to fit into the new international scenario 
and the solution to the problem posed by the Spanish pharmaceutical 
industry’s dependence on other markets. 
We have so far highlighted the main conclusions as far as the 
evolutionary process of pharmaceutical patent protection is concerned. We 
will hereafter look closer into the reflections drawn from the time when 
pharmaceutical patent protection entered into force in the Spanish legal 
system onwards. This covers the time after the stage of transition, which 
lasted until 7 October 1992, even though Spain’s reservation was expected 
to operate for only one year, that is, until 7 October 1987.
Nonetheless, and as observed, the decision to exert the right to 
reserve was not only made by Spain, but also by other states that could be 
cataloged among the “least technologically advanced”. Turkey and Portugal, 
for example, took the decision to express their disapproval of the rigid 
monopoly that the coming European patent system would entail. 
Accordingly, in Spain, where the protection plan used for 
pharmaceutical products had been thus far based on process patents, 
certain common practices such as the vindication of the so-called 
analogous procedures, or the purchase of intermediate products by Spanish 
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laboratories, could be detected on the international markets where the 
exclusivity provided by patents was nonexistent. 
This brings us back to the circumstances that led to the above 
mentioned ‘pressing need’ to protect pharmaceutical product inventions 
in Spain through a system that, despite criticism for its rigidity, was, we 
insist, essential to ensure effective protection of the interests of innovative 
pharmaceutical laboratories, both in those countries that were reluctant 
to contemplate this channel, and in the rest of countries, non-European 
in this case, that signed the TRIPS Agreement, which is the international 
document that finally consolidated pharmaceutical patents as a requirement 
to become part of a new scenario in WTO driven international commerce.
Against this background, by the adjustment of pharmaceutical patent 
protection to the Spanish legal system through the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 
1994), Spanish patent law manages to finally align with that of developed 
countries at the time. And this was possible because the legal solution that 
enabled it, envisaged the modification within the Agreement of the section 
listing the circumstances that prevented the patentability of pharmaceutical 
products, as reflected in Law 11/1980 on patents, and despite the fact that 
the Munich Convention, to which Spain was already a party, also envisaged 
this channel, although with a later implementation date due to the right to 
reservation.
Another highlight is the Agreement’s role as a global milestone in the 
field of intellectual protection and its development in its various spheres of 
action, on the one hand, and as an instrument with considerable impact on 
the internal legislation of the acceding states, on the other hand. 
The declared aim of all this was to widen the scope and improve the 
international trade scene, overcoming many of the barriers that prevented 
its progress, such as a patent system that was not globally standardized and 
required common bases to foster R&D and assert owners’ rights against 
a series of practices that infringed them, such as the activities of the non-
innovative pharmaceutical industry. 
Within this framework, it seems clear that by laying the foundations to 
govern pharmaceutical patents in terms of international trade and internal 
regulations, the Agreement provided for a broader protection of innovative 
laboratories’ rights that, in the case of European patents claiming chemical 
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and pharmaceutical products –naming Spain– were applied for before 7 
October 1992, or with equal claims with priority deadlines before such 
date, or pending granting according to the date of implementation of the 
Agreement in this country, becoming validated under article 70.7 of the 
Agreement. 
In fact, the implementation of pharmaceutical patent protection 
through the TRIPS agreement posed a real challenge for Spain’s legal system 
because of its retroactive effect on a scenario already built from formerly 
consolidated conditions. In particular, these include the legal and practical 
effects of the application of articles 27, 70.2 and 70.7 of the Agreement on 
rights established under the previous regulation. It all finally comes down 
to the tension caused by preventing new laboratories to enter the market 
as competitors supported by the implementation of the mentioned rules, 
versus infringement upon the interests of laboratories that were already 
operating on the market. 
Nevertheless, beyond this tension and the evolution of the 
jurisprudential precedent that deserved full attention as part of the historical 
review of pharmaceutical patents in Spain, emphasis should be placed 
on the trade openness that, as underlined, was introduced in the case of 
pharmaceutical products through the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 1994). 
As well as being one of the many globalization processes driven by 
the WTO, this openness was a framework of reference for the formulation 
of pharmaceutical R&D policies based on multilateral trade regulations. 
It is not surprising that the analysis of the jurisprudential precedent and 
casuistry leads to the conclusion that a state’s market size and the nature 
of its R&D capacities largely determine the potential effect of intellectual 
property rights on policies aimed at fostering strategic areas of innovation 
and development.
Along these lines, governments themselves, mainly in the countries 
mentioned in chapter five as belonging to the ‘economic north’, are more 
inclined to strengthen their intellectual property regimes when their 
industries’ intangible assets contribute substantially to maximizing national 
wealth. However, it is also clear that each sector’s structural characteristics 
and the nature of their respective scopes of activity are decisive in the 
shaping of the policies to be made, since the needs and expectations of an 
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industry such as the pharmaceutical are not always the same as those of 
others devoted to the production of intangible assets, such as the cultural 
content industry, to mention but one example.
While at this stage we maintain that the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 
1994) has been a fundamental axis for the pharmaceutical sector and, most 
especially, for innovative laboratories whose R&D processes are supported 
by the exclusive rights granted by patents both at the domestic level and 
at that of international trade, we must also draw attention to the issue of 
the Agreement’s impact on laboratories that produce generic drugs, not as 
a sector that necessarily intends to benefit from the former, but as suppliers 
of the domestic market of developing countries, since the low prices of 
these drugs make them accessible to the general population, safeguarding 
such right and thereby the right to health care.
With their entry into the international trade market, it was no 
surprise that developing countries had reasonable expectations about 
taking a leap and moving into the new medication market. Currently, 
decades after the promulgation of the Agreement, this is yet to become 
a reality in most of these countries, leaving open whether patents, at the 
macro level, are appropriate for fostering pharmaceutical R&D in such 
countries. Nevertheless, without the intention of generalizing, we believe 
that the impact of intellectual property rights on the processes involved in 
the development of new inventions is indeed always subject to a number 
of factors –such as the availability of raw materials or local government 
incentives, among others– that goes beyond mere exclusivity in production 
and marketing.
Nonetheless, the major problem is the hovering tension between 
access to drugs versus the mentioned exclusivity. This is why the WTO 
issued the 2001 Doha Declaration on public health and trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights. The decision is based on two axes: 
(i.) the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 1994) stating the desire 
to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, promoting 
effective and adequate protection of the interests of the holders of 
intellectual property rights and (ii.) recognition of the specific needs of the 
least developed member states, such as improvement of patients’ social and 
economic well-being. 
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As far as we are concerned, the Declaration takes into account the 
concerns of the early 2000s about anticipated consequences in terms of 
access to medicines, several of which still persist to date. Thus, Colombia, 
a country where equal access to drugs, a reality in the economic north, is 
still a utopia, became the arena for a conflict between the government and 
the global healthcare company Novartis over declaring the drug product 
Glivec of public interest with a view of issuing a compulsory license on it, 
not to mention other high-profile cases in countries such as South Africa, 
India or Brazil. 
Thus, the concerns taken into account in the Declaration revolved 
around the adoption of measures to safeguard public health interests, 
creating a very favorable panorama for hundreds of millions of patients in 
the world who do not have equal access to medication. Noteworthy among 
the measures adopted is the right of member states to use the Agreement’s 
flexibilities, particularly in terms of parallel imports and compulsory 
licenses. 
In our opinion, this is the very foundation of the recognition in 
international trade of the power of member states’ governments to take 
such measures as may be deemed appropriate to protect public health in the 
event of a coalition with the interests of patent holders. An analysis of the 
Agreement’s provisions shows that it pays close attention to (i.) economic 
disparities among member states, while also (ii.) providing for exemptions 
and limitations to rights, in accordance with the public interest, for cases 
such as a predictable national emergency. 
Regarding the international trade system, member states have a 
certain degree of freedom of choice to redirect their public policies in terms 
of access to drugs, since neither the concept itself nor the scope of what 
may constitute a patentable invention is defined in the body of the TRIPS 
Agreement (WTO, 1994). The margins for interpreting the requirements 
for the granting or refusal to grant patent rights are not defined either. This 
gives states some discretion to adjust both their own definitions and their 
legal scope to social and economic considerations.
Additionally, as noted in the study, this allows states to design 
their regulations so that they may include different methods, such as the 
establishment of specific requirements of the standardization of domestic 
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regulations to those of a state signatory to a TRIPS-Plus Agreement, so that 
only ‘justified patents’ are granted. However, one of the implications of 
this is that it could produce the opposite of the desired effect by tilting the 
balance between access to medication and the owner’s rights in favor of the 
latter. This is the case with the mentioned extended terms of protection to 
compensate for undue delay in the patenting process.
We believe that this not only infringes the right of access to medicines 
but that it is also detrimental to growing innovative pharmaceutical 
industries at the local level. And, returning to the case of Spanish laboratories, 
whether it is plausible or not to develop a strong local pharmaceutical 
industry should be the subject of future discussion. It is important to bear 
in mind that a strong regulatory regime in terms of intellectual property 
is crucial to structure national capacities in innovative sectors such as the 
pharmaceutical, which is, besides, highly competitive.
Historical evidence of this can be found in the fact that leading 
countries in this field, such as Germany, Switzerland or the USA, have 
greatly benefited from having an intellectual property system conceived 
to strengthen such capacities. While not intending to wander off the 
topic, the case of Germany is especially interesting because its patent 
system contributed to boosting local innovative industries through reverse 
engineering and by absorbing emerging technologies from abroad.
Nevertheless, the mentioned balance finally tilts against patients 
when the adoption of ever-greening strategies and other practices for 
extension of the exclusivity period that, taking advantage of regulatory 
gaps, divert exclusivity away from its role of fostering R&D to a playing 
field where patented products and processes, being minor changes, do not 
contribute to the state of the art nor to the fulfillment of the social function 
of intellectual property rights. 
Indeed, the real goal is to keep competitors, in this case, generic 
medicine laboratories, out of the market to maintain prices at levels that 
suit laboratories engaged in these practices, prices above those that would 
be set in competitive scenarios. This is where the measure of autonomy and 
room to manoeuver that states might have come into play to prevent the 
proliferation of applications for pharmaceutical patents on molecules that 
do not constitute a true innovation. 
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This is one of the reasons why in this study we chose to emphasize 
the feasibility of adopting certain national measures that, tough equally 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 1994), may correct this 
type of practices. Thus, the international trade system, through the WTO, 
provides for the authorization of its member states to design and apply their 
own regulations concerning patent rights on pharmaceutical inventions. 
In the light of this research, and aside from the legal controversies 
addressed in it, the recent reality of certain generic medicine laboratories 
in Spain has been far from encouraging, since the trend in the area has 
shifted towards the innovative sector. More striking, however, is the case 
of some of these laboratories that, having been authorized to produce 
and commercialize by the Spanish Agency of Medicinal and Healthcare 
Products (AEMPS), were forced to stop doing so when the right existing 
since the 1973 Munich Convention was acknowledged by precedent in 
favor of innovative laboratories. 
This new landscape led to the submission to the Court of several 
legal controversies regarding pharmaceutical product inventions that, per 
the claimants, should not be patent-protected, or at least this should be the 
case with those registered before 7 October 1992. However, beyond the 
legal aspects of the carefully analyzed case studies included in the previous 
chapter, we believe that a reflexive approach requires close attention to 
pharmaceutical patents in relation to access to medication rather than 
considering the future of pharmaceutical patents only as an incentive 
mechanism for R&D per se. 
This is even more significant if both case-law and the normative 
area guarantee the innovative pharmaceutical industry such incentive. 
We should bear in mind the law’s commitment to strengthen the different 
innovative sectors, which is pursued through the creation of rights such 
as supplementary protection certificates or test data protection. Both are 
mechanisms to extend the exclusivity of pharmaceutical inventions after a 
patent has expired. Our concern in this regard is that they are barriers that 
block access to medication, especially in developing countries. 
Indeed, after activating these two mechanisms by granting either of the 
rights, innovative laboratories would become qualified to prevent generic 
drug laboratories from producing the drugs whose patents expired. First 
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because the effective patent term becomes extended and, second, because 
by claiming ownership of the test data yielded by medicine validation 
research they can force generic drug laboratories to produce their own data 
and, as mentioned, this could even lead to opposing the transfer of these 
data by regulatory agencies to other public entities. 
Over the course of the research, these situations gave rise to several 
questions: what would happen if the body in charge of assessing the safety 
of a drug was denied access to the relevant clinical data? Would the right 
to health and, therefore, the right to life of patients taking drugs that have 
not been properly assessed be guaranteed? In a second scenario: would 
this same right be guaranteed in a setting where hundreds of millions of 
patients every day are unable to access drugs or healthcare because of the 
high prices of medicinal products?
When analyzing such issue in the light of the international trade 
system, and of the TRIPS Agreement in particular, our questions are a 
shared issue with Ortega-Gómez (2016), who believes that this instrument 
does not improve the picture since, after the entry into force of the TRIPS 
Agreement in a large number of developing countries, the high cost 
of medicinal products under patent protection has become an almost 
insurmountable barrier to the citizens of these countries’ access to essential, 
new and high-quality drugs. 
Since the Agreement fails to include clauses and mechanisms that 
should serve to mitigate the negative effects of the agreement, and this is 
exacerbated by the fact that we insist, the burden of drug acquisition costs 
is borne by patients themselves or otherwise by public healthcare systems 
that are on the verge of financial collapse due to these high costs. 
Added to this, we must also mention the blocking of compulsory 
licenses with data exclusivity since, as we stated, even when approval 
of a generic drug has been obtained, it is beyond the question that the 
laboratories in charge of producing them should also hold the data 
recorded by the local healthcare regulatory agency. Let us also remember 
that compulsory licenses are the mechanism par excellence that allows 
drugs under patent protection either to be produced as generic products or 
to be imported, without the need to obtain the owner’s permission for the 
effects of mitigating health emergency situations.
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To close this section, we acknowledge the fact that the 2001 Doha 
Declaration (WTO, 2001) marked a significant step towards laying the 
foundations for access to medicines, although statistics indicate that, since 
then, the mentioned reality faced by hundreds of millions of patients that 
die while waiting for timely and proper treatment has not particularly 
improved. This concern was addressed in the Sixty-Seventh World Health 
Assembly held in 2014, where some of the guidelines for implementing the 
Doha Declaration postulates were discussed, although this is not a short- or 
even mid-term perspective, but still a utopia. 
Therefore, we believe that the responsibility to solve the situation 
should rest with governments, because of their power to actively intervene 
in the pharmaceutical market. Thus, policies on access should be 
redirected, without infringing patent owners’ rights, towards securing due 
remuneration for the efforts invested in the development of new medicinal 
products. 
This could be achieved, for example, through a coordinated strategy 
by University, business sector and state with a view to intensifying in-house 
research and the development of new drugs by building alliances between 
these sectors. In the end, it is about these other two sectors accepting their 
social responsibility and redesigning their role in society to proactively 
search for solutions to the problem. 
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